

## Message Text

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ACTION AF-18

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

INR-11 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03

SS-20 USIA-15 SAM-01 EB-11 FEA-02 INT-08 OMB-01

TRSE-00 OPIC-12 CIEP-03 AID-20 DRC-01 /192 W

----- 121326

R 251045Z JUL 74

FM AMCONSUL LUANDA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2809

INFO AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

AMCONSUL LOURENCO MARQUES

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L 0610

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR US AO

SUBJECT: ALTERNATIVES IN US POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA

REF: LUANDA 0606

1. REFTTEL LISTED MAJOR US INTERSTS IN ANGOLA. WHAT IF ANYTHING US DOES TO TRY TO PROTECT THESE AS ANGOLA MOVES, POSSIBLY RAPIDLY, TOWARD COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE SEEMS TO BOIL DOWN TO THREE ALTERNATIVES:

A. SIT TIGHT, CONTINUE AS AT PRESENT WITH HANDS-OFF POLICY, BUT BE READY AT SOME FUTURE TIME TO TAKE A MORE ACTIVIST ROLE IN PROCESS OF DECOLONIZATION. GOOD IN PAST, THIS ALTERNATIVE IS NO LONGER VIABLE.

B. MAKE POSITIVE RESPONSE TO RECENT GOP (AND MFA) APPROACHES TO USG FOR SUPPORT IN PORTUGAL'S EFFORTS TO UNLOCK PROBLEM OF

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ANGOLA'S FUTURE, E.G., BY OFFERING OUR SERVICES AS INTERMEDIARY

WITH INDEPENDENT AFRICANS (AT UN AND BILATERALLY) IF AND WHEN GOP REQUESTS. THIS ALTERNATIVE HAS MERIT, BUT PROBABLY WOULD BE PREMATURE.

C. INITIATE DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS (ON OUR OWN BEHALF, NOT GOP'S) WITH INSURGENT MOVEMENT LEADERSHIP OUTSIDE ANGOLA, TO ESTABLISH BASIS ON WHICH TO BUILD A HEALTHY RELATIONSHIP WHEN INDEPENDENCE IS ACHIEVED, AND TO BE IN POSITION TO INFLUENCE EVENTS IN THE INTERIM. THIS SEEMS TO ENTAIL NO RISKS, AND IN FACT IS OVERDUE. DISCUSSION FOLLOWS.

2. FIRST ALTERNATIVE IS LINE OF LEAST RESISTANCE, AND HAS VIRTUE OF KEEPING OUR HANDS CLEAN ESPECIALLY IF PORTUGAL'S AGONY OVER ANGOLA IS PROLONGED. ONE OF BASIC ERRORS WE HAVE MADE SINCE 1961, WITH RESPECT TO PORTUGUESE AFRICA, WAS TO ASSUME EVENTS WOULD MOVE FASTER THAN THEY DID. DO-NOTHING BY USG NOW, HOWEVER, SERIOUSLY RISKS PROBABILITY THAT EVENTS WILL PASS US BY, AND THAT AN INDEPENDENT ANGOLA, UNDER NEW MANAGEMENT PROBABLY FAIRLY HOSTILE TO US INTERESTS, MAY INTERPRET OUR POSITION (AS MOST INSURGENT MOVEMENTS HAVE IN PAST) AS OPPOSITION TO THEIR ASPIRATIONS. THIS COULD POSE SERIOUS HAZARD TO OUR INTERESTS IN ANGOLA LATER ON. ALL IN ALL, I DO NOT CONSIDER THIS A HEALTHY OPTION FOR USG NOW.

3. SECOND ALTERNATIVE HAS MUCH TO COMMEND IT, IF WE ACCEPT THE BASIC PREMISE THAT THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH PORTUGAL (I.E., AZORES AND NATO) SIGNIFICANTLY OUTWEIGHS THE IMPORTANCE OF ANY FUTURE US-ANGOLAN RELATIONSHIP (I.E. PROTECTION OF OIL INVESTMENTS AND ACCESS TO PORTS) AND MAKES THE "RISK" OF OUR BEING OPENLY IDENTIFIED AS PORTUGAL'S BROKER WORTH TAKING. FROM HERE, WE CANNOT GAUGE WHETHER THERE IS IN FACT ANY RISK INVOLVED IN THIS POSITION. IF PORTUGAL IS NOW DETERMINED TO RID ITSELF OF ITS COLONIAL ALBATROSS, AND WE CAN HELP IT OUT, IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW OUR AFRICAN FRIENDS OR THE INSURGENT MOVEMENTS COULD RESENT US, IF WE SUCCEED.

4. AS REPORTED EARLIER (LUANDA 379) WE BELIEVE IT LIKELY THAT MPLA-DOMINATED GROUP WILL EVENTUALLY COME INTO POWER HERE. MPLA HAS A HISTORY OF ANIMOSITY TOWARD USG, APPARENTLY PROPORTIONAL TO THE DEGREE OF ITS DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COMMUNIST SOURCES OF FUNDS AND WEAPONS. SINCE AMERICAN

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DIPLOMATS ARE NOT ACQUAINTED WITH MPLA'S LEADERSHIP (IN BRAZZAVILLE, LUSAKA OR DAR ES SALAAM) IT IS DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE WHETHER THE LATTER'S ALLEGED MARXISM IS DEEP, OR WILL REPRESENT AN INSURMOUNTABLE BARRIER (AS IN BRAZZAVILLE) TO NORMAL RELATIONS WITH USG. ALTERNATIVE (C) IS INTENDED TO OVERCOME MPLA'S HOSTILITY, OR AT LEAST PERMIT US TO GAUGE MORE PRECISELY HOW MUCH TROUBLE WE WILL HAVE WHEN THE MPLA TAKES OVER, BY PLACING US IN DIRECT DIPLOMATIC CONTACT NOW WITH THIS LARGELY UNKNOWN ORGANIZATION.

UNTIL WE CAN BETTER ESTIMATE THE REAL NATURE OF MPLA, ALTERNATIVE  
(B) - FULL DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR PORTUGAL -- MAY IN FACT BE  
PREMATURE.

5. IN APPROACHING MPLA IT WILL BE USEFUL TO RECALL THAT ITS  
POSITION ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT SHIFTS FROM ONE SPOKESMAN TO ANOTHER,  
BUT AT LEAST THE PINTO DE ANDRADE BROTHERS (AND MPLA REPRESENTATIVES  
WITH WHOM WE ARE IN CONTACT IN LUANDA) SAY THEY FAVOR CONTINUED  
FOREIGN, PRIVATE INVESTMENT. MPLA HAS NOT DIRECTLY ADDRESSED THE  
QUESTION OF CABINDA'S OIL SINCE BEFORE THE APRIL 25 COUP IN  
LISBON, BUT HAS SAID CABINDA MUST REMAIN POLITICALLY TIED TO  
ANGOLA.

6. FOR THE PRESENT, OUR BEST COURSE AS SEEN FROM THIS ADMITTEDLY  
RESTRICTED VANTAGE POINT, WOULD SEEM TO BE TO GET ON WITH  
ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC CONTACT WITH MPLA'S LEADERS, AS SOON  
(RPT AS SOON) AS MPLA SOLVES ITS CURRENT LEADERSHIP CRISIS.

7. INFO ADDRESSEES MAY WITH TO COMMENT.  
BRIGGS

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